THE COLDEST PRIZE SAMPLE AND SYNOPSIS
Note: Due to the nature of this text's mitigated subject matter entailed in this factual account, the following background suffices as both a synopsis and a sample of the text.
THE COLDEST PRIZE: Antarctica’s Epic Explorers––Amundsen, Scott, and Shackleton depicts The Heroic Age (1895-1922). Notably, these three celebrated discovers account for Antarctica’s most ambitious explorers, and all of whom had distinctive personalities that determined their respective outlooks and idealistic notions about this, the last continent to be explored during the latter part of the 19th and early-20th centuries. This so-named white continent is arguably the toughest landscape on the Earth and boasts the worst year-round climate imaginable. The salient details of this story follows.
INTRODUCTION: Robert Falcon Scott. the H.M.S. Discovery; Roald Amundsen, the Fram; Sir Ernest Shackleton, the Endurance; McMurdo Sound, Bay of Whales, the Beardmore and Axel Heiberg glaciers, the Weddell and Ross Seas...what do these names mean about Antarctica? The answer is these legendary surnames and the vessels each explorer used are the crux of what the great Heroic Age represents. Rightfully, the Heroic Age begins with Scott. His orders were issued by Sir Clements Markum and allowed that the young lieutenant was the first scientific explorer to go to Antarctica. In 1895, Markum proposed an International Geophysical Congress to take a more scientific comprehension of the uncharted continent. Before the scientific explorations, only sealers interested in commerce ventured that far south. Markum thought Scott was the right man for the job, even though Scott was not considered a noteworthy military officer. Still, Markum thought Scott had the right stuff to command the expedition. Scott’s bold determinism and the fortitude that went along with it was bolstered by his sheer willpower to successfully complete the assignment. Scott also had the right scientific acumen to handle the kind of exploration the Congress was looking for. As for having the solid credentials to navigate in a strange and unknown frozen continent, Scott was an amateur who went up against much greater odds due to his lack of experience in any Arctic wilderness, north or south.
On July 31, 1901, the determined commander, Scott, set sail from London with 48 men onboard the H.M.S. Discovery. He left with King Edward VII and Alexandria’s blessings, and British tradition was on his side, or so he might have assumed in his over inflated ego to get the job done. One of the men with him was Ernest Shackleton, a merchant seaman, and officer, who was popular with the men. He was also an extrovert, which sorely contrasted with Scott’s introverted tendencies. Both men turned out to be disparate team partners for the adventure of a lifetime.
Heroism and suffering mark Scott’s first expedition as a prevailing theme. But he didn’t have prior experience to lead the exploration and neither did any of the others with him. In fact, it was an incompetently led trip based on British mindset at that time (i.e., more is better, and the British rule and tradition will always prevail). The Discovery arrived at the Ross Sea and wintered over at McMurdo Sound. It was science that brought the men there, but without proven exploration abilities. Both Scott and Shackleton were also adventurers. It was the undiscovered country they were there to uncover and Scott intended to be the first to stand at the South Pole with his small expedition party of three: Scott, Shackleton, and Dr. Edward Wilson. It was a grueling eight hundred mile journey, and Scott approached it as though it might be a walk in the park. At least, that is how his legacy in 1902 would turn out.
The three men set out for the South Pole on November 2, 1902. his polar plateau region sits high atop 9,000 feet of ice, where the average temperature is minus 70° Fahrenheit. The polar region is a flat, featureless facade capping the glaciers. Locating at 90° latitude, the South Pole is an abstraction in the sense there is no there. It’s simply a low pressure high altitude zone (about 10,000 feet above sea level), windy, barren and unbroken ice, with recycled snow (i.e., blizzards and typical whiteout conditions). In short, the South Pole the three men were looking for was utter desolation. Getting there was dangerous, difficult, and debilitating in a psychological sense. First, they had to cross the Ross Ice Shield, then climb the Beardmore Glacier to the plateau, and finally the polar plateau itself. Along the way, they would set up food and fuel depots at one hundred mile intervals so that they would have what they needed on the way back to home base. The supplies, therefore, added to the great weight on the sleds. To make matters worse, none of the men knew how to handle the dogs, let alone were capable skiers. Scott decided the three of them would pull the sleds. In his eyes, man-hauling was nobler and humane. It was also reckless, arduous, and arrogant of him to think they could make it to the South Pole without the assistance of the dogs. The trio was also much too sentimental about the dogs and often let them ride on the sleds. As a consequence, the dogs were bored. They simply had no leadership and could not do what they were trained to do. Then again, Scott and his fellow trekkers didn’t bother to learn how to handle the dogs. Sadly, the dogs, despite how easy they had it, were fed the wrong diet (i.e., dried fish, some of it rotten and frozen).
Essentially, man-hauling caused Scott’s failure to reach the South Pole. So did poor nutrition in the form of scurvy (i.e., vitamin C deficiency) that affected the physical and mental health of the men. By December 30th they made it only as far as 82° 16’ and were less than halfway to the South Pole. They had not even left the Ross Ice Shelf due to having to tote the heavy sledges on their own. The decision was made to return to base. The race was also underway to try and save their pitiful lives. The challenge they took on was met too lightly. They were inexperienced, they had no dog training, much less inclined to try and use the dogs for what the dogs did best, and the three men were not capable skiers. Giddy, breathless, sometimes coughing up blood, they hauled the sleds back to base camp. Most of the dogs were slaughtered for meat. Only two dogs remained on the day of their departure. The rest had already been slaughtered for food to feed the men and the other dogs.
Bitter personality differences also arose between Shackleton and Scott. All three men’s deteriorating health conditions didn’t help matters. But Shackleton continued to pull his sled, even though his condition was worse. On the second of February, 1903, the three men returned to McMurdo Sound. They were fortunate to be alive. Shackleton’s health returned, while Wilson took longer to recuperate. But Scott had ordered Shackleton to return to London on the relief ship, which Shackleton contested. His pleading to stay fell on deaf ears, however. It would seem Scott sensed a formidable rival in the effusive, charismatic, and very determined officer he originally invited to be one of the party to discover the South Pole. Wilson remained behind.
When Shackleton got back to England, he began to lecture abroad. Scott returned on September 10, 1904 and did likewise. Their failure to get to the South Pole was only the first step each explorer would take. In time, both would return to try again, only they would never be on the same team.
In August 1907 Shackleton was ready to return to the coldest, driest, windiest continent on the planet. Antarctica is also the highest continent in elevation. More importantly, no one thus far had made it to the South Pole. Shackleton was going to make the second attempt. Departing London on the vessel, Nimrod, Shackleton was forced to winter over in McMurdo Sound, which did not sit well with Scott. Apparently, the two rival explorers had an agreement McMurdo was Scott’s turf. As it turned out, due to the limitations he faced with the heavy pack ice Shackleton couldn’t get to a more convenient place to launch his next foray. Forced to winter over in McMurdo Sound, some of Shackleton’s winter shore party constructed a crude 30 x 20-foot hut on Ross Island while the others remained aboard the Nimrod.
On October 29, 1908, another South Pole adventure was on. Shackleton selected James Adams, Eric Marshall, and Frank Wild to go with him. This time they took Manchurian ponies to pull sleds. They were thought to be sturdy beasts that could handle the load and do a better job than dogs. It turned out the ponies died early on into the trip. Once again, it was a poorly planned, poorly organized excursion. Shackleton still didn’t know too much about how to use and handle dogs that would have done the job had he known how to utilize their strength and talent. Despite this major flaw in Shackleton’s comprehension about such matters, he was still considered a great leader and was very popular with his men. He loved a challenge, always rose to the occasion, and set out to do what he, Scott, and Wilson couldn’t do in 1902. In just twenty-nine days Shackleton had passed Scott’s old record. The determined Shackleton party crossed the Ross Ice Shelf and ascended the rugged Beardmore Glacier, all of which was uncharted territory. They were on the broad, expansive, and desolate ice dome a last. At an average of 7,000 feet in elevation, the low pressure due to the spinning of the Earth on its axis and the rarefied air taxed their lungs. But the four explorers only made conditions worse because they were man-hauling the heavy and cumbersome sleds. Because there were no more horses to butcher for their meat, along with diminished stores, Shackleton had to make one of the most difficult decisions any explorer has to make: to continue on or turn back. They were already low on meat and there were no more horses to butcher. Shackleton knew what he and the others were up against.
They were seven hundred miles into the journey and were just ninety-seven miles short of their goal. Malnutrition, scurvy, and low energy due to a poor diet set in helped Shackleton make the decision to abort the mission. They also weren’t properly dressed for the climate, which only added to the bitterly freezing temperature that assailed their bodies. Shackleton simply didn’t listen to the wisdom of the Northern indigenous people of the Arctic who knew dogs worked better than men or horses. The Eskimos also wore loose-fitting reindeer and wolf skins to keep them warm and with perspiration that only made matters worse. By using skies or snow shoes they could also make better time on the polar ice. But none of these things seemed to have crossed Shackleton’s or Scott’s minds. If they did, then it sheer willpower and force that these pioneer polar explorers hoped to get them through the ordeal they took on, only to fail in the attempt.
The geographic coordinates 88° 23’ S 162° E recorded on January 9, 1909, was as far as Shackleton’s party got on his attempt. He must have thought to himself he could have made it all the way, except Shackleton had sense enough to know he would not make it back. His famous words to his wife of her preferring him as a live donkey than a dead lion proved he was not the fool. It also proved he was considerate of his men and did not want to risk going any further. Not favoring his duty or personal goals over survival would play a major role in his next expedition and its failure to achieve what Shackleton set out to do and find.
This time, Shackleton went back to London and was knighted for his heroism. The South Pole was still unexplored territory, and, therefore, posed quite the prize and the challenge for the explorers who were still determined to go after it. Shackleton was one of them, but his turn would have to wait. Scott, meanwhile, was ready for his second attempt. So was another explorer no one thought was even interested in the South Pole. Strangely, the race to be the first to reach the South Pole didn’t start off as a race. At least, not as far as the British were concerned.
Robert Falcon Scott, now a seasoned polar veteran, returned to Antarctica with gusto. However, his second attempt to conquer the South Pole was similarly flawed in comparison to his first attempt. This time, he placed too much importance on rank and protocol and both were irrelevant values in the austral wilderness. Unknown to Scott at that time, he was up against a superior opponent who would take the South Pole out of Scott’s hands, Roald Amundsen. This intrepid explorer used a tactical, disciplined methodology approach and that made all the difference in being the first person to make his mark on the vacuous locale known as the South Pole. He also gathered a smaller and much more elite team that wasn’t competing with itself.
Nevertheless, in 1909 the race to the pole was set to begin anew and Scott eventually found out there was, in fact, another contestant from Norway who wanted to claim the price.
Scott’s new chartered vessel, the Terra Nova, set sail on June 6, 1910. Onboard were sixty-five men, thirty-four dogs, and nineteen Siberian ponies. In addition, there were three motorized tractor-driven sleds that purportedly would make transporting the heavier bulk of supplies much easier on this second attempt to conquer the South Pole. Scott’s view approach that more is better approach was still not well thought out. It fact, his polar exploration philosophy still wasn’t a specialized task force. Neither was the community of men on this second voyage a tightly knitted group, much less focused. Still, Scott pressed on and probably thought he had more than enough men and equipment to do what had to be done. This time, he decided to use two separate polar parties. One was bound for the South Pole, which he would lead, and one would explore King Edward VII Land.
In the meantime, Roal Amundsen had been set to be the first explorer to reach the North Pole, only to find out someone had already beaten him to it, Perry. But the twelve years Amundsen spent training for the polar region, including spending a lot of time with the Eskimos to find out what they knew about trekking in such arduous wilderness, was not wasted. Realizing Scott was already on his way to the opposite pole, Amundsen planned to depart Norway without letting anyone know his final destination. He kept his plans to himself and he knew how to keep a secret. He may have also figured the element of surprise would work to his advantage once he told the world what he intended to try and accomplish.
Amundsen was by far the most seasoned person to take on the challenge and succeed. In addition to the time he spent learning how to trek in the polar region, he was an astute listener who learned from the Eskimos how to best go about it. Because Antarctica was not inhabited by humans, what Amundsen learned in the north polar region could just as easily be applied to the southern polar region. It was simply a longer voyage he had to make and he and his men were prepared to do it.
The Norwegian vessel, Fram, set sail under the cover of darkness two months after Scott departed. There were ninety-seven dogs and just nineteen men in his crew. For a while deception was theirs and worked to Amundsen’s advantage. On the cruise, his men continued to refine their talents, skills, clarity, purpose, and logistics of the mission. Above all, his men were disciplined as a team. Thus, there were no rogue members. There was only one leader, Amundsen. He set up camp in the Bay of Whales January 19, 1911, at the far inland edge of the Ross Sea. His team was well prepared and had trained for just about every known contingency Amundsen could think of to keep the men at their ready. There was a surprise for the Scott expedition, for Amundsen never sent word to anyone that he was prepared to take on the South Pole challenge until he was about halfway to Antartica. Amundsen sent Scott a telegram that stated Amundsen’s intention. Whatever Scott thought about the curt message, he still didn’t consider a race was on. He simply never got into that mindset.
Amundsen was in Antartica on January 19, 1911, two months after Scott had arrived. He anchored in the Bay of Whales at the far end of the Ross Sea and wasted no time setting up food depots that would become his life security to and from the South Pole. Meanwhile, the veteran South Pole explorer, Scott, returned to Antarctica practically a virgin. That is, he learned little or nothing about the kind of terrain and climate he was up against. Amundsen, on the other hand, already knew the challenge he faced without having to go that far south. For example, he and his men were expert skiers, they knew how to handle dogs and let them do most of the work, and the importance of having the right clothing. Reindeer pelts and wolf skin was ideally suited for polar trekking because it was not only warm but loose-fitting. It was, therefore, possible to wick the moisture and not let one’s perspiration while exercising get to the point it was damp, chilling, and seriously debilitating. Amundsen also loathed man-hauling. He even had the apparel Scott’s men used to attach themselves to the sleds, which Amundsen used as a deterrent for his men if they didn’t work their dogs properly.
The other part of Amundsen’s nature that worked to his advantage was how meticulous he was in planning out his operation. For example, he would place his food and fuel depots at each and every latitude, which were sixty miles apart. Scott placed the depots at one hundred mile intervals, just the way he did in his first, failed expedition. Amundsen also relied on his dogs hauling the sleds, not his men. This, alone, would save the men’s strength. Thus, they could ski faster, eat better, stay warmer, and do far more with less work than Scott’s party could possibly manage. In the case of extremely foul weather, which Amundsen counted on, the depots would be well-marked by flags, so that even in the poorest visibility he could find them. In short, Amundsen was calculating and he took no chances. He and his men trained well and everyone he took along on the expedition was an expert in his respective field. Even the dogs Amundsen used to get to the South Pole were killed on the return journey, either to feed Amundsen and his men or else used for food to feed the other dogs. His methodology and sticking to details and organization were flawless, even if his slaughtering the dogs was questionable and insensitive.
Here were two entirely different men who had little or nothing in common. Scott was all military. He stood apart from his men for the most part, while Amundsen relied on his, and, therefore, ran his campaign with them. His campaign was a veritable guerrilla warfare plan that utilized a specialized task force of men to get the job done. He also relied on a much smaller group that was better supplied and well stocked with provisions, proper polar clothing, and fuel. Thus, they could travel more lightly and quickly, and above all, there was no man-hauling. There were also no mechanical tractors or ponies. Amundsen’s group was consequently very fast and very efficient in every respect. They also sustained no injuries, no setbacks, and no deaths.
Both parties waited for the ideal time to assault the South Pole. There was much preparation and route finding to do, including securing their respective food and supplies stores. Finally, it was time to go after the prize. On October 20, 1911, Amundsen with four of his best men set out for the South Pole. Twelve days after Amundsen left Scott departed with his party, including the ill-fated ponies. The mechanized tractors failed almost immediately. Scott relied on the ponies to get him to where he had to go, but they didn’t last too long. All died en route to the Beardmore Glacier. Scott would rely, instead, on man-hauling, the way he did on the first ill-fated journey.
Meanwhile, Amundsen was sixty miles closer to the South Pole where he had established his base camp (near the Bay of Whales). He also found another route to the South Pole Plateau via the Axle Heiberg Glacier. It was arguably a tougher route up to the plateau though shorter than the Beardmore route. Amundsen knew his men could do it because that was the kind of arduous terrain they had trained in and were prepared to tackle.
On the ninth of December Scott had the last of the five ponies killed at the base of the Beardmore Glacier. Even though these men were stalwart and in excellent physical shape, they were not suited to the kind of terrain and labor Scott’s men ventured into. The three-man party was also less than a quarter of a way to the South Pole. Brutal man-hauling commenced. Scott still didn’t catch on to the value of using dogs to haul the heavy sleds, while Amundsen’s tactics were to use his dogs until he had no further use for them.
For Scott, it was a long and difficult journey from the outset. Amundsen, however, average twenty miles a day across the Ross Ice Shelf which was twice as many miles as Scott could manage. Amundsen pioneered a route up through the Axle Heiberg glacier and the mountains beyond. On November 19, 1911, he and his men were at the foot of the glacier, which was an 8,000-foot rise over twenty miles compared to the more gradual one hundred mile ascent Scott faced on the less demanding Beardmore Glacier.
It took Amundsen a mere four days and forty-two of his dogs doing relays to get them to the polar plateau. Scott and his men took longer. they hauled two hundred pounds each up the Beardmore Glacier. This physically demanding effort diminished their strength caused a vitamin C deficiency, which was a deja vu curse and haunt from the first expedition, and the trek up to the final staging area was long and debilitating besides. Scott and his men also wore Burberry and woolen underclothing, which was tight-fitting and made them more susceptible to the cold. Additionally, they were traveling later in the season compared to Amundsen’s party. Nevertheless, Scott relied on iron will and face the danger, regardless the danger, to pull them through. It had always been his (and Shackleton’s) main trust to get the job done that way. In truth, Scott’s method to keep himself and his men moving was typical British egoism. Moreover, he wasn’t racing to get to the South Pole. He had never intended to make his second attempt a race to the finish line and we simply don’t know if he even took Amundsen’s message as a potential rival to sour his plans to be the first to reach the South Pole.
Amundsen was always at home in the South Pole, while Scott was little more than an alien who still understood very little about the environment he and his men were up against. He probably put so much faith that his iron will would eventually prevail kept him going, despite the difficulties his party faced on all fronts.
The other unfortunate mistake Scott made was to select four men to go with him to the South Pole. Yet they only had rations for four men, including Scott. The South Pole party consisted of Scott, Dr. Edward Wilson, Edgar Evans, Captain Oats (who had been in charge of the horses until they were killed), and Scott’s personal favorite and friend, Henry Bowers, navigator, who was a late addition to the team. Oats was also a representative of the Army and Scott wanted him on the team, even though Oats wasn’t in physical shape due to his previous war wounds and other physical limitations compared to the others. The 10,000 foot mean elevation and minus 20° Fahrenheit temperature steadily dropped. They had made a much later departure than Amundsen and there was still a long way to go between the food depots they set up to make the return journey. Then the day came with Scott and his resolute men finally got to the South Pole. It was January 17, 1912, and they were in for quite a shock and surprise. Seeing Amundsen’s former camp tent must have been quite a terrible sight that they homed in on. Nevertheless, he had been there at the same spot thirty-five days early. His dash to the South Pole got him the prize on December 14, 1911, and now they were well on their way back to their home base.
The three men in Scott’s party took their photographs and measurements. Their bodies were exhausted, as were their minds, and their egos deflated. This caused them a new psychological disadvantage in addition to the 4,500 calories they were reduced to all along. It should have been 6,000 calories if they hadn’t brought the 5th man along, yet Scott was a stickler for protocol and that’s why Captain Oats struggled along with the others.
Two months and eight hundred miles from the Bay of Whales to the South Pole via the uncharted new glacier Amundsen and his men tackled must have buoyed the Norwegian’s spirits to a new high. They scored twice the daily mileage compared to Scott’s party. Amundsen and his men even had more food and fuel then they could utilize. Even the dogs enjoyed the excess bounty. It was basically a walk/ski in the park for the experienced Norwegians. Amundsen was a brilliant planner who left no stone unturned.
It took Scott and his men two and a half months to get to the South Pole and the photographs that preserve their triumph reveal the stress and anguish they felt. They were exhausted and now there was nothing more for them to do except return to home base, second best. Scott wrote in his diary entry on the seventeenth of January, “Great God, this is an awful place and terrible enough for us to have labored to it without the reward of a priority. Now for the run home and a desperate struggle. I wonder if we can do it?”
It is one thing to stress the body to its maximum, and not have enough fuel, as calories, to do the work. But the psychological depression Scott and his men felt had to be worse. Low rations, poor food, the onset of scurvy that Wilson had previously experienced, and Scott to some degree, and the excessive waste of physical energy because they were forced to do man-hauling to get back to each and ever depot, added up to mental defeat long before their bodies gave out. The race to the South Pole was no longer a race for Scott and his men, but a desperate race for them to get back to their home base. Due to their late start leaving their home base, was also getting colder (i.e., now minus 5 degrees more than when they left).
Amundsen, meanwhile, averaged twenty-five kilometers on the return to his home base. He and his men had bounding energy. They were back at Framheim in January and departed for Norway. Returning in less than six weeks, the men departed for Norway on January 30, 1912. They had traveled 1,400 miles on the polar ice without any mishap whatsoever.
But Scott and his men didn’t fare so well. They were still on the polar plateau as winter approached. Evans was hit the hardest and collapsed on the Beardmore Glacier. He died later that night in his tent. The others continued on, but also stopped to gather geological samples that only added to the weight of the sleds. Perhaps Scott thought it was best to keep his men busy in this task, just to try and keep their minds off of total physical exertion and starvation. By early March, they were quickly losing hope of making it back to home base. Now -43° their clothing was stiff and scratched their tender bodies. There were food and fuel shortages and a long way between the depots that lined the way. Oats had frostbitten feet and was told he would have to have them amputated, or else he would die in that lonely land. On the seventeenth of March, he left the tent under the pretense he was only going out for a walk and would be back. He died in a raging blizzard and was never seen again. It was his thirty-second birthday and Oats had sacrificed himself rather than slow down the already terribly slow pace of the party.
There were just three men left and they pressed on for two more days. They were about eleven miles south of what they called the 1-Ton Depot. this final depot was about one hundred and fifty miles from their home base but they could not venture on due to another fierce blizzard. That blizzard also kept them pinned down in their tents for ten days. Their rations were also much shorter and the men were starving and freezing to death.
On the twenty-ninth of March, Scott wrote in his journal, “I do not think we can hope for better things now. We shall stick it out to the end, but we are getting weaker. Of course, the end cannot be far. It seems pity but I do not think I can write more. For God’s sake look after our people.” It was his final entry. The men's bodies were found the following year. They were all in their sleeping bags and both men on either side of Scott died with a peaceful look on their face. Not so, Scott, for it appeared he resisted death and suffered until his last breath snuffed out his life.
Today, a plane cross overlooking McMurdo Sound reads, “To strive, to seek, and not to yield.” The words are from Tennyson and is a fitting description for Scott’s party. Had they made it back to base camp they would still have been considered heroes, despite Amundsen’s victory, and despite Scott’s failure to adequately prepare for such a daunting mission. Instead, his poor planning and careless attention to the fundamental details of trekking in Antarctica and preparing for any journey cost the five men their lives.
Sir Raymond Priestly, the explorer, once said words to the effect, “For scientific discovery give me Scott. For speed and efficiency of travel give me A. But when disaster strikes and all is hopeless get down on your knees and pray for Shackleton.”
Even though Shackleton’s third return to Antarctica proved to be a disaster, yet it was no fault of his in some respects, his odyssey stands as one of the greatest all-time heroic achievements. In short, Shackleton turned misfortune into fortune. He and his men faced death and turned tragedy into a stunning victory against all odds. But he did not come back to try for the South Pole since it had obviously been claimed as a prize by Amundsen. Instead, Shackleton, in his usual larger-than-life perspective took on a greater challenge: he wanted to trek across Antarctica, starting at the Weddell Sea and going to the Ross Sea, where he had been twice before.
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